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This paper looks at the degree to which spatial inequalities reinforce other forms of social 
inequality in cultural labour markets. It does so using the example of London, an 
acknowledged hub for the creative and cultural industries (CCIs). Using pooled data from 
2013 - 2015 quarters of the UK Labour Force Survey we consider the social make-up of 
London’s cultural labour force, and reveal the extent to which, rather than acting as an 
‘engine room’ of social mobility, London’s dominance in fact re-enforces social class 
disparities in cultural employment. 
 
Keywords: cultural labour, inequality, arts education, London 
 
Introduction 
The figure of the artist has a strong hold on the urban imagination.  Whether starving 
in garrets, kick-starting gentrification or inventing the next trend, movement or scene, the 
artist is invested with huge symbolic agency when it comes to influencing the image of cities 
(Florida, 2002; Hall, 1999). At the same time, artists are often described as being ‘drawn’ to 
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cities, the implication being that there is no choice for the ambitious or even the curious, but 
to go to the big city and try to make it. In the British imagination, London has played such a 
role at least since the Middle Ages (Fielding, 1992). A city whose fortunes have long been 
decoupled from that of its host nation, London is the financial, political, educational and 
cultural capital of the UK. It represents a degree of centralisation which has, wisely, not been 
replicated by most other countries.  
This paper looks at the role of London in reproducing a particular form of both social 
and spatial inequality in cultural labour markets. Its starting point is the discourse of the 
‘creative city,’ within public policy, the argument that urban areas would retain their historic 
advantages in cultural production, even as digitalisation made dispersed production a 
possibility (Mould, 2015). For many policymakers this opened up opportunities for cities in 
the Global North suffering the effects of de-industrialisation and has thus been embraced as 
an economic development strategy from Detroit to Derby. Also central to this strategy was 
the idea that the cultural and creative industries (CCIs) represented a labour market which 
was meritocratic, and which opened up opportunities to women, those from Black, Asian, 
Minority Ethnic (BAME) backgrounds, and working class people, who had been not only 
disadvantaged in other professional labour markets, but particularly hard hit by the form of 
neoliberal economic growth (Oakley, 2014). These assumptions have proved to be ill-
founded, as even advocates of this position, such as economic geographer Richard Florida, 
have recently admitted (Florida, 2017). Culture labour markets, far from opening up 
opportunities, in fact tend to be dominated by white men from relatively privileged 
backgrounds (Friedman et al., 2016). 
This paper considers this relationship between place and other forms of inequality, 
particularly as it applies to global cities like London. Specifically, the paper looks at how the 
cultural dominance of world cities like London operates at the level of the labour market, and 
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the way in which, by clustering particular sorts of cultural activities, it reinforces other socio-
economic, for example gender, ethnicity, and particularly class-based, divides. It also 
considers the role of higher education and particularly arts education within this 
phenomenon. London is not simply home to high-level cultural employment but to some of 
the UK’s more elite art colleges (Banks & Oakley, 2016). Does higher education, as is 
sometimes the case within other professional labour markets, have an ‘equalising’ or 
mitigating effect on these inequalities? How does the relatively weak link between 
credentialisation and professional cultural practice play into this? And what are the 
challenges from this analysis for arts educators at a time of rising inequality? 
The first section of the paper sketches out the relevant literatures and the policy 
discourses of which they are a part. The CCIs have become central to the economies of many 
countries (UNCTAD, 2015) but they are also used to make other normative claims of 
meaning, identity, even equity (Oakley & O’Brien, 2015). The second part of the paper 
challenges some of those claims, using data on industry composition, class origin and the 
‘London effect.’ Our analysis provides an important frame for discussions of the role of arts 
graduates in society. The analysis demonstrates that an important policy story- the link 
between arts education and the CCIs (Ashton & Noonan, 2013)- is not supported by data on 
this section of the labour force. Moreover, by reading this data from a spatial perspective, a 
crucial element in how CCIs cluster together (Campbell et al., 2017; Markusen & Gadwa, 
2010; Zukin, 1999), we show the need for more attention to be given to the nexus between 
arts education, place, and the creative economy. If, as we demonstrate, arts education cannot 
mitigate the broader inequalities of class, race, gender, and place underpinning the creative 
economy, then it is vital for new lines of defense to be found in discourses of the role of arts 
in society.  
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Literature Review 
London: The creative city as an idea and as policy 
We begin with the importance of London as a site for intersecting inequalities in the 
UK’s approach to the creative city. The evidence suggests that most CCIs are biased to the 
urban; that is CCIs are more likely to be found within cities (Zukin 1998; Hall 1999; Florida 
2002). There are a variety of reasons for this. The tendency for cultural workers to co-locate 
is driven by the opportunity of employment in urban networks, alongside the need for cultural 
producers to swap ideas and contacts, socialise together and trade industry gossip (Currid 
2007; Lloyd 2006). Communicating these ideas is best done face-to-face, even in activities 
such as videogames production that make much use of digital technology. Indeed research 
suggests that the higher up the value chain -- and the closer to the creative elements of 
production – the more likely it is that face-to-face interaction will be important (Pratt, 2011).  
At the same time, these urban networks of cultural production have an 
interdependence with cultural consumption. Opportunities for cultural consumption are 
generally greater in cities than elsewhere, and the link between production and consumption 
in these places is strong, often manifest in ‘scenes’ associated with particular sites (Crossley 
2015). Indeed, whilst specific cultural occupations, for example artists, are present across 
national and regional geographies (Markusen 2013), they tend to cluster in one or a handful 
of core cultural centres (Menger 1999).   
For firms in the CCIs, and for the associated leisure sectors from bars and clubs to 
coffee shops and independent retail, being located in certain areas can be invested with what 
is sometimes referred to as ‘symbolic capital’ (Zukin 1998; Lloyd 2006). The growth in 
importance of creative city policies and the ideology of urban competiveness means that 
cities have, in recent decades, sought to ‘operationalise’ creative activities and the associated 
symbolic capital to produce economic results. There has been a rise in ‘active state’ policies 
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from the expansion of higher education, including arts, design and media subjects, to public 
investments in workspaces, studios and incubators, publicly-funded networks and 
intermediaries and tax incentives devised to lure firms, particularly in the media sectors, from 
one urban location to another (O’Connor & Gu, 2013).  
Efforts to capitalize on CCI as an urban growth strategy have not been without 
some success. In the UK, jobs in the CCIs have continued to grow and according to the UK’s 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport, they made up just over 5% of the UK economy in 
2016, accounting for some 1.9 million jobs. Between 2013 and 2014, these sectors grew by 
8.9% as opposed to 4.6% for the economy overall (DCMS, 2016). Recent data (Mateos-
Garcia & Bakhshi, 2016) suggests that more than 90 per cent of local economies in the UK 
have seen increases in cultural sector activity, but - crucially - regional differences remain 
and have deepened. The counterpart to the tendency of cultural activities to cluster together, 
is that they seem to cluster more effectively in some cities than in others (Scott, 2005). Other 
towns and cities attract web designers and some back-office software production, but, in the 
UK, little troubles London’s longstanding cultural and economic dominance. Together with 
the South East region that surrounds it, London accounts for half of all cultural sector 
employment in the UK, has 40 per cent of the UK’s cultural workers and a third of all its 
businesses in that sector (Mateos-Garcia & Bakhshi, 2016). There is thus a clear geographic 
inbalance associated with cultural work in the UK. Indeed, this is reflected not just in cultural 
production, but in cultural consumption and associated state funding. The concentration of 
‘national’ cultural institutions helps ensure that public arts funding is more than ten times 
greater per capita in London than the rest of England (Stark et al 2013). Concurrently, 
debates and campaigns associated with arts education (e.g. Arts Emergency 2017) have 
asserted a relationship between inequality in cultural jobs and arts courses in higher 
education.  London is especially important to this story as a result of its dominance with UK 
Commented [AF1]: Full citation still missing from 
References 
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cultural production networks and its status as host to key arts schools, drama schools, and 
other creative education facilities. 
In the policy imagination, far from reinforcing inequality, London has long been seen 
as the ‘engine room’ of social mobility, an ‘escalator region’ where the talented and hard-
working are most readily able to get ahead in the education system and labour market 
(Fielding, 1992; Greaves et al, 2014; Social Mobility Commission, 2016). Yet this view has 
recently been strongly challenged. Savage and Cunningham (2015: 321) argue that 
contemporary London is not so much an escalator region but an ‘elite metropolitan vortex’ – 
‘a space where the coming together of intense economic, social and cultural resources enable 
the crystallization of a particular elite social class formation’ with ‘an increasing propensity 
toward self-recruitment’. This argument has been further substantiated by Friedman and 
Laurison (2017) who uncover a marked ‘class pay gap’ in London’s higher professional and 
managerial sector. These authors find that those in these occupations working in the capital 
from working-class backgrounds earn, on average, £10,660 less per year than those whose 
parents were in higher professional and managerial employment.  The inequality that 
separates London from the rest of the UK is mirrored, spectacularly, within the city itself. 
London is home to some of the UK’s poorest citizens, while such is the concentration of the 
global super-rich that even many of its middle-class residents feel squeezed out of its housing 
market (Atkinson et al, 2016). The wealth of the best-off 10% living within London is over 
100 times greater than that of the poorest 10% (Dorling, 2015).  
Yet while one might expect that traditional professions such as law and medicine are 
dominated by the privileged – many, including in the policy community, would be surprised 
to learn that the same is true of the CCIs. The promotion of cultural industry strategies in 
economic development discourse has long suggested that not only is this sector open to talent 
from anywhere but that such diversity is part of their life blood (ACE 2015). Indeed, the 
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current minister for culture in the UK has declared that the arts ‘are one of the greatest forces 
for openness and social mobility’ (Hancock 2016).  
 
Inequalities in cultural labour markets 
The type of policy rhetoric associated with diversity and social mobility has gone 
hand in hand with questions of representation and inequality in cultural production. These 
questions have, in turn, been matched by the growth in academic work on cultural labour in 
general (Banks, 2017). What has long been apparent to scholars in the field (see Oakley and 
O’Brien 2015 for a summary of this work) – that the CCI workforce is less ethnically diverse, 
more male and skewed towards those of a higher socio-economic background than most other 
sectors of the economy - is being increasingly recognised by the media, policymakers and a 
wider commentariat, prodded in part by media coverage and by policy interventions such as 
the ones noted in the previous section.      
O’Brien et al (2016) have demonstrated the range of social exclusions in CCI 
occupations. For example, the exclusion of those from less affluent social origins: 43% of 
people working in publishing, 28% in music and 26% in design come from privileged 
backgrounds, compared with 14% of the population coming from this same social origin. At 
the same time fewer than 7% of employees in many CCI occupations are from black or 
minority ethnic origins, an underrepresentation compared to the rest of the population as a 
whole and a major underrepresentation compared to the black and minority ethnic origin 
population of London. There are also under-representations of women in key cultural sectors 
such as film, TV, radio and photography, IT and architecture.  Other data suggest a loss of 
women from these industries, even where the numbers entering are similar to men. A survey 
of the media sectors (film, TV, radio and photography) reveals that women aged 35 or over 
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are particularly under-represented, compared with both men of the same age and women aged 
less than 35 (Creative Skillset, 2014).  
Our focus within this paper is primarily on class-based inequalities, and how these 
inequalities complicate the narrative of the creative city. Until very recently, this area has 
received less attention than other aspects of inequality, in part because of the difficulty of 
providing data on class. This is because unlike other ‘protected characteristics’ such as age, 
ethnicity, disability, gender and sexual orientation, there is no requirement on public agencies 
to collect data in terms of social class. Moreover, the historical narratives of class and 
creative work common to policymakers such as Hancock (2016) occupy an important 
position in distorting class as a category in cultural labour research.  As Banks has 
commented (2017), there was of course no ‘golden age,’ in terms of equality, class based or 
otherwise in the CCIs. The ‘opening up’ of cultural employment in the 1960s and 70s, often 
symbolised by working and lower-middle class success stories from the Beatles to David 
Hockney, coincided with a general expansion of white-collar employment in much of the 
Global North and a growth in post-secondary and higher education. Yet while this created a 
greater sense of opportunity, there is little evidence that working-class people did better vis a 
vis the middle class. There was simply ‘more room at the top’ (Goldthorpe et al, 1980).  
What the narratives of CCIs during this period did however – via a ‘Swinging London’ myth 
revived at the turn of the millennium – was to cement the idea of the CCIs as open, 
meritocratic, even classless. Thus, the intersection of creative city, class inequality, and the 
economic imaginary of creative labour (Campbell 2013) require critical scrutiny.  
 
The role of arts education 
One of the starting points for this critical scrutiny is education. One of the ways in 
which opportunities in cultural work were said to have opened up was via Britain’s post-war 
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expansion of higher education, and its diversification into polytechnics and colleges. For 
most of the 20th century, many smaller UK towns and cities had their own independent art 
school, predominantly serving local working- and lower-middle class populations at a time 
when only a few universities offered fine art degrees and tended to recruit their students from 
more privileged social groups (Frith & Horne, 1987). The art school thus came widely to be 
known as an accessible alternative to university, offering the ‘masses’ the viable prospect of 
practically-oriented craft and aesthetic education.  
This hypothesis – of higher education as the ‘great equalizer’ - has some precedent in 
the literature on social stratification (Ballarino and Bernardi, 2016). For example, in a 
seminal paper Hout (1988) found no association between social origin and occupational 
outcomes among people with a university education in the USA. A similar effect was also 
reported more recently in Sweden (Breen and Jonsson, 2007). Education, on this reading, 
served to combat class based discriminations, albeit only for those able to gain entry in the 
first place. 
Yet there is a crucial difference between the CCIs and other sectors of the economy, 
which is the relative unimportance of formal educational qualifications. Although research on 
arts school graduates in particular suggests that they do try to pursue careers within the arts 
(Oakley, et al, 2008), the relatively small number of such graduates, the importance attributed 
to ‘learning on the job,’ and the possibilities for developing relevant skills outside of higher 
education (for example as a hobby or pastime) means that relevant higher education 
qualifications are simply less important in these sectors than in others (Comunian et al 2011). 
Employers in the CCIs themselves have often shown equivocation about the relevance of 
formal vocational education. Many employers have not been ‘trained’ in the crafts they 
practice. They may have studied something else at college, are self-taught, or have failed in a 
variety of jobs and careers before they found their niche (Towse, 1976). Even where they 
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have specialized education programs in fields like film or music, aspirants must nonetheless 
“gift” their labour (often as unpaid interns) to build the skills and networks to be considered 
for employment (Banks & Oakley, 2016; Frenette, 2013; Hesmondhalgh & Baker, 2011). 
This has produced a culture of skepticism among employers and reliance instead on 
demonstrated experience, or, on what might be called the ‘guru’ method, whereby people’s 
credentials are established by the quality of those they have worked with, rather than by 
paper qualifications. 
Indeed, even those who have argued most eloquently for the importance of the arts 
school as a route into the CCIs (eg, Frith & Horne 1987, Childress and Gerber 2015, Banks 
and Oakley 2016) have not done so on the grounds of credentialisation, but of socialization. 
In the milieu of the art school in the 1970s and 1980s, the role of the institution was as much 
about commitment to a cultural practice and the creation of a “scene,” as it was about 
formalised, targeted or vocational education.  As Frith and Horne (1987) pointed out, it was 
college bars and student unions, equipment and studio space, combined with exposure to 
contemporary debates in politics and the arts, which acted as an incubator.  
The period from the late 1980s onwards have seen arts schools move away from this 
more informal, experiential, and institution-based type of learning towards greater 
credentialisation, formal work-based learning and internships, and absorption into the 
University system. The art school in every UK city is disappearing and where it exists is 
likely to be part of a (high fee-charging) university. At the same time, and more disturbingly, 
in fields where credentialisation is weak, a whole host of other social factors become more 
important. In the case of working in the CCIs, these include parental background, location, 
social networks and cultural capital (Friedman et al 2016; Randle et al, 2015; Duffy, 2016). 
The equalizing effect of education that was the basis for the optimistic narrative of cultural 
work as open and meritocratic is highly problematic in the current context.  
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Data and Method 
To understand the impact of London on the cultural workforce, and thus on the 
production of Britain’s national culture, alongside the impact, or otherwise, of specific routes 
into this workforce, the paper now turns to an analysis of the Office for National Statistics’ 
(ONS) Labour Force Survey (LFS). The LFS represents the largest nationally representative 
sample of employment in the UK, with around 100,000 respondents surveyed annually. We 
draw on data pooled from nine quarterly LFS surveys from July 2013 to September 2015, 
obtained under a special license agreement so that we could match individuals across 
quarters, and in order to access the detailed occupational codes (4-digit SOC 2010) for their 
parent’s occupations. We first used the DCMS Creative Industries Estimates (DCMS, 2015a) 
in order to assign occupations (based on 4-digit SOC2010 codes) to the nine sectors of the 
CCIs (outlined in Table 1). To consider class composition, we then identified the respondents 
employed in these occupations who also responded to the social origin question in the July-
September 2014 or 2015 survey. This question asks respondents the occupation of the main 
earner parent when they were 14. We then group respondents’ social origins into four groups 
based on the National Statistics Socio-economic Classificationi (NS-SEC) classesii; those 
with parents in NS-SEC 1 (higher professional and managerial occupations), in NS-SEC 2 
(lower professional and managerial positions), NS-SEC 3, 4, or 5 (intermediate occupations 
or self-employed), or NS-SEC 6-8 (semi-routine, routine occupations, or unemployed). We 
also removed all those under 23, in full-time education, or over 69, as the LFS collects data 
on those over 69 differently, since most people in this age group have moved into retirement. 
This leaves 2677 respondents in CCI occupations, 1514 of whom also have earnings 
information (1293 with data on all covariates used in regression models iii). It is important to 
note that the LFS does not collect earnings information for respondents who are self-
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employed, which we recognise is an important part of the cultural economy; thus, all reports 
of earnings below are only for those who are employees. The self-employed are included in 
our descriptive statistics below, but we are unable to say anything here about the earnings 
situation for self-employed workers in the CCIs. We can see, then, the three areas for analysis 
of the current settlement in cultural and creative jibs: the impact of broad social inequalities 
associated with class; the impact of specific social inequalities associated with geography, 
particularly the role of London; and the mitigating, or otherwise, effects of education, in 
particular arts education. 
 
The Social Composition of UK Cultural Employment 
We begin our analysis with a descriptive portrait of the demographic makeup of 
cultural employment in the UK. Table 1 shows the social composition of the CCIs in terms of 
ethnicity, gender, age and earnings. It demonstrates what is now a familiar pattern that 
women, and to a lesser extent those from Black, Asian, and minority ethnic (commonly 
abbreviated BAME in the UK) backgrounds, are underrepresented in Britain’s CCIs 
compared to the rest of the population. This finding builds on existing work by O’Brien et al 
(2016) that demonstrates similar patterns in earlier LFS data, as well as the extensive 
literature (exemplified by Conor et al 2015) on the gendered nature of exclusions within CCI 
occupations.  
Table 1 also demonstrates demographic variations within the nine individual sectors 
that make up the CCIs as defined by the UK government. These data are consistent with 
inequality highlighted in previous research, with women particularly poorly represented in IT 
and BAME groups constituting less than 5% of those working in film, television, music and 
museums (O’Brien & Oakley 2015; Banks, 2017). It is also important to note the striking 
variations in earnings in different areas of cultural employment. Average earnings in areas 
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such as IT and advertising, for example, are far above the national average, whereas those 
working in crafts, music and museums report earnings significantly below the national 
average. This wide variation echoes longstanding critiques (e.g. Campbell 2013) of the 
aggregation of very different forms of occupation into ‘creative’ industries, in particular the 
differences in occupational structure between IT and the more ‘cultural’ occupations 
associated with performance and the arts. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Next we turn to the class composition of the CCIs. A focus on the class origins of 
those employed in different sectors within the CCIs, as shown in Table 2 and Figure 1, points 
to two significant findings. First, it is notable that those from privileged backgrounds – with 
parents employed in higher (NS-SEC 1) or lower (NS-SEC 2) professional and managerial 
occupations – form the majority in almost every part of the cultural sector. For example, 
those from elite origins (NS-SEC 1) make up 13.7% of the total UK labour force, but 
represent 30.2% of Advertising and Marketing, 22.5% of Design, 25.8% of Film, TV, video, 
radio and photography, and 28.9% of Music, performing and visual arts. Figure 1 
demonstrates the same findings but displays the results in terms of how overrepresented or 
underrepresented people from certain class backgrounds are in CCI occupations compared to 
the UK as a wholeiv. This shows that those from higher managerial or professional 
backgrounds are more than two times more common in advertising and marketing, 
publishing, or music, performing and visual arts, than in the population as a whole. Second, 
there is also significant variation by individual sector. Craft employment, for example, is 
largely made up of those from working or intermediate class backgrounds, whereas areas 
such as architecture and publishing are dominated by the privileged.  
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[Table 2 about here] 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Results 
The London effect and inequality 
While the data presented so far updates (and largely echoes) previous analyses of 
inequalities in the UK CCIs (O’Brien et al, 2016), in this paper we are especially interested in 
examining whether this inequality is patterned spatially in ways that reflect London’s 
dominance within the UK. 
In Table 3 we therefore examine how the demographic makeup of cultural 
employment in London varies relative to the rest of the UK, both the urban and non-urban 
areas. The demographic differences are immediately obvious:  cultural workers in London 
have less gender skew, and are more ethnically diverse and younger than those in the rest of 
the UK (though there is not much difference in age between those in London and those in 
other urban areas in the UK). It is also striking that those employed in London’s cultural 
sector tend to come from significantly more privileged backgrounds. While over 60% of 
those working in the CCIs in London are from professional or managerial backgrounds, the 
figure elsewhere in the country is around 45%.  Those in London also earn on average 19% 
more than elsewhere in the UKv. This both reflects the higher cost of living in the capital but 
also indicates that such employment tends to be higher status and higher profile.vi 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
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While those from more modest social origins are underrepresented in London’s 
cultural labour force, it is also important to ask whether they face barriers to progression once 
within these jobs. Existing research on the professions in the UK (Laurison and Friedman, 
2016) has demonstrated a clear ‘class pay gap’ between those from affluent and those from 
more humble social origins. There is also evidence that such barriers to progression exist in 
some sectors of the CCIs, such as acting (Friedman et al, 2016).  Next we examine this issue 
more widely in the CCIs as a whole, exploring how average earnings vary by social origin in 
London and elsewhere in the UK. Of course, earnings do not represent a definitive indicator 
of career progression, but in the absence of data on occupational position they represent the 
best available proxy and an important indicator of success in their own right. Table 4 shows 
two key findings. First, it demonstrates that those from lower social origins in the CCIs earn 
somewhat less on average in both London and the rest of the UK - a ‘class pay gap’ across 
the aggregated CCI sector. Moreover, this class pay gap appears larger in London. Those 
from working-class backgrounds earn on average only 85% of what those from higher 
professional and managerial backgrounds earn in London, whereas elsewhere in the UK the 
same figure is 90%.      
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
While this class pay gap is striking, it is important to note that a distribution of 
earnings averages cannot tell us whether the upwardly mobile face a ‘class ceiling’ or pay 
discrimination. After all there may be simple demographic explanations for this difference – 
the privileged could simply be older on average, which would explain these higher average 
earnings. Similarly, there may also be ‘meritocratic’ explanations for the pay gap difference. 
For example, of particular interest to the readers of this Special Issue may be the hypothesis 
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that the privileged are simply more highly or specifically educated, and if we examine 
cultural workers who are all graduates, or more specific types of graduates such as arts, 
humanities or social sciences, it may be that the pay gap disappears. 
In order to interrogate this hypothesis and to disentangle other potential sources of 
class-origin income difference, in Table 5 we take the CCI class pay gap in the UK as a 
whole and show a series of nested linear regressions that control for other potential sources of 
income inequality. In the first column, we include controls for gender, ethnicity, country of 
birth, and age as well as for paid hours worked and the quarter in which the respondent gave 
earnings informationvii. In the second we add measures of education: the highest degree or 
qualification the respondent has achieved. The third column adds a dummy variable for 
whether a respondent lives in London or notviii; in the final column we add dummy variables 
for each of the individual sectors within the CCIs.  
Significantly, Table 5 illustrates that the class pay gap in the UK CCIs is actually 
larger once we control for demographic variables. For example, those from working-class 
backgrounds who are otherwise similar in all the demographic ways we can measure, face a 
statistically significant pay gap of, on average, nearly £6,500 a year compared to those from 
higher professional and managerial backgrounds.  
Table 5 also shows that this gap is somewhat ameliorated once we control for 
education, but the difference remains both statistically and substantively significant: working-
class-origin people have predicted earnings of nearly £4900/year less than privileged-origin 
people in the CCIs even net of the effect of education. Education, then, certainly does not act 
as the ‘great equalizer’ in the CCIs and the direct effect of social origin persists. It is also 
worth comparing this to other professional and managerial occupations in the UK, where 
research has shown that controlling for education reduces pay gaps from GBP 7600 to 4400 
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(Friedman et al, 2017), or about 40%, while here we see a 25% decrease in the estimated pay 
gap.  
Table 5 also adds further insight into the role of London, the engine for the growth, 
but seemingly also the inequality, of the CCIs. Table 3 has already demonstrated that those 
working in London’s CCIs tend to be from more privileged backgrounds, and earn more, but 
Table 5 demonstrates that even once we control for living in London, the class pay gap 
remains statistically significant. In other words, the class pay gap in the CCIs is not being 
driven by the fact that people from working-class backgrounds are less likely to enter 
London’s more lucrative CCI labour market.  
Indeed, it is only once we control for the specific sectors of the CCIs that the class 
pay gap loses statistical significance. In other words – and as demonstrated in previous 
analysis (O’Brien et al, 2016) – the class pay gap is partly explained by the fact that the 
privileged are more likely to enter higher-paying sectors such as advertising, IT and TV and 
Film, whilst those from working class, or more humble social origins, are more likely to work 
in sectors such as Craft, which are associated with lower pay.  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Art education, credentials and the labour market 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
Although cultural labour markets have above-average representation of those with 
undergraduate degrees (see Tables 6 & 7), there is no simple coupling of qualification with 
employment trajectories. There are of course areas, from acting to museum curating, where 
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formal training in a specific discipline is strongly linked to employment. But it is equally 
likely to be the case that a general humanities or social science degree, coupled with interest 
in consumption or personal practice, is what leads to a career in the cultural occupations. 
Similarly, as Table 6 shows, those with arts degrees work throughout the economy. 
As Table 7 shows therefore, while over half of those (56%) working in the UK CCI 
occupations have a university degree, only 29% are arts graduates. Moreover, and most 
notably, in every CCI occupation apart from design we do not find a statistically significant 
earnings return (based on conducting regressions of earnings for each CCI separately) for 
having studied an arts degree compared to not having been to university at all.  
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
The relatively weak link between credentials and employment therefore mean that arts 
education cannot perform the same equalizing function that it may do in other cases, because 
its impact on the labour market is simply less important.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The closing comment of the previous paragraph gestures towards an uneasy 
conclusion for those seeking to hold onto meritocratic narratives of cultural work. Indeed, it 
suggests that even higher education, which the literature on professions suggests might assist 
in mitigating the effects of social inequality, is insufficient to overcome the impact of class 
and geography on creative occupations. As our analysis shows, cultural labour markets are 
highly unequal. From our case study of the UK, we can see women, those from racial and 
ethnic minorities, and individuals from working class backgrounds are all under-represented 
in professional employment, with notable skews in some of the more prestigious sectors. For 
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example, in the cluster of occupations containing film and TV, less than 5% of the workforce 
is from an ethnic minority and less than 30% are women. There is also strong evidence that 
those from working class backgrounds are under-represented across the board, again 
particularly in those sectors with the greatest symbolic capital and (arguably) the greatest 
influence e.g., film and TV, or publishing.  Such findings also support the major media and 
public debates over the struggles for cultural representation (Friedman and O’Brien 2017). 
What has been less discussed however are the ways in which space and place, and 
particularly spatial inequality, plays into this story.  There is a huge and longstanding 
literature, particularly within economic geography, on the location of cultural production 
(Pratt, 2008), the dominance of particular urban centres (Scott, 2005) and on the way in 
which public policy has sought to develop the CCIs outside of these dominant areas (Lee et 
al, 2015). Behind much of this work is an implicit story about inequality – why some cities 
rather that others? Why is symbolic capital so vested in Paris, New York or Milan, but not 
Montpelier, Dayton or Catania? Can public policy change this dynamic and can, as Richard 
Florida and others have claimed, any place become a hotspot for the creative class?  It is 
against this background that, as scholars who write about inequality, we sought to bring 
together work on space and place and on labour markets and to examine the ways in which 
the cultural, social and economic current of this story reinforce one another. 
In our case the focus of attention was London, which as the paper explains, dominates 
British cultural, political and economic life in ways which are extreme and unusual, though 
we believe that the findings do have implications for other, less centralized societies, where 
cultural and symbolic power is nonetheless vested in a small number of specific ‘cultural 
capitals.’ Our findings suggest that there is a ‘London effect,’ with those employed in 
London’s cultural sector more likely to come from privileged backgrounds than in the rest of 
the UK. Those in the cultural sectors in London earn more than in the rest of the UK, which 
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is hardly surprising, but there is also a class-related pay gap; workers from lower 
socioeconomic origins in the CCIs earn less on average in both London and the rest of the 
UK- a ‘class pay gap’ across the aggregated CCI sector. But this class pay gap is larger in 
London, where those from working-class backgrounds earn on average only 85% of what 
those from higher professional and managerial backgrounds earn, whereas elsewhere in the 
UK the same figure is 90%. As a reminder, our findings on earnings only apply to those who 
report earnings, not to the 12% of CCI workers who say they are self-employed, or the 33% 
of CCI workers who do not report earnings for other unknown reasons.  That is an important 
limitation, however this is the best available data on earnings in the CCIs, and while there 
may be other patterns for the people who do not report, we believe these patterns are an 
important basis for future research.     
In other professional sectors there is evidence that higher education substantially 
mitigates this class origin pay inequality. In the CCIs, the equalizing effect of higher 
education is significantly more modest. This may, of course, change over time, as the 
workforce, along with the rest of society, becomes more credentialised. We will, of course, 
need to return to this question over time. However, our current analysis has two important 
implications for arts graduates and their educators. The first is that the economic case for arts 
education must be rethought in the face of evidence suggesting arts education is yet to deliver 
a secure, credentialised, route into the CCIs (see Martin & Frenette, THIS ISSUE, for more 
on unequal professional outcomes among US arts graduates). The second lies in the defense 
of the art school and arts education. In our analysis of British data, the financial case for arts 
education, in terms of future earnings (and leaving aside exceptionally successful ‘stars’), is 
weak. Other nations’ artistic labour markets may have different dynamics protecting returns 
on arts education (e.g. Bille & Jensen, 2016 on Denmark) and it may be the case that arts 
education is providing valuable skills for other sectors of the economy and other forms of 
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economic activity beyond CCIs (Brigstock and Cunningham 2016). Entrepreneurial activity 
is clearly part of that; the SNAAP data suggest that some 16.1% of arts graduates in the US 
claim to have founded a non-profit or for-profit at some point in their working lives 
(Frenette & Tepper, 2016). The specific dynamics of British cultural labour markets, along 
with the destinations of artistic graduates, suggests that justifying these experiences in terms 
of social justice or in terms of broader economic impact, as has become de rigeur, is limited.  
The traditional narrative of the art school, and the sorts of defence offered by Frith 
and Horne (1987), drew on the importance of place in association with the values of the 
institution. As our analysis of the uneven geography of the creative labour force suggests, 
there is a need to return attention to spatial issues when considering cultural work. As it 
stands the interventions to make towns and cities ‘creative’ in the UK has not challenged 
London’s dominance of this section of the labour force. Nor has the creative ethos and the 
meritocracy of talent seemingly fostered by the arts degree overturned this settlement. 
If we are to see society fairly reflected in its cultural workforce then creative city 
policy must interact with broader issues of uneven geography, in the UK or elsewhere. 
Moreover, the assumption that any single policy intervention, whether urban, educational, or 
cultural, will untangle the Gordian knot of CCI inequality must be challenged. This 
challenge, as we have shown, requires the intersection of cultural, educational, industrial, and 
urban policy to address both the well-known inequalities of culture and the ‘London Effect’ 
we have demonstrated. The challenge is steep, but the opportunities for cities and towns 
offered by a fairer, more diverse, cultural labour force served by an open and meritocratic 
education system, are rich goals worth pursuing.  
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i NS-SEC is a socio-economic classification made up of 7 analytic classes and similar in structure to the 
Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portacerero (EGP) schema used in the US. 
ii ii We use Table 10 from http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/classifications/current-standard-
classifications/soc2010/soc2010-volume-3-ns-sec--rebased-on-soc2010--user-manual/index.html at 
ONS, the “simplified scheme” to match parents’ 4-digit SOC2010 occupational codes to the analytic 
NS-SEC categorization 
iii The 221 cases with missing data were excluded via list-wise deletion, as recommended by Allison (2001). This 
approach is appropriate in regressions, unless there is a probability that the predictor variables in a model are 
missing because of the dependent variable; it seems unlikely that this is the case here. 
iv If all class backgrounds were equally represented in each of these occupations then all the bars would be 1. 
v The similarity in earnings between London and non-urban areas is primarily due to the over-representation of 
the highest-earning sector of the CCIs, advertising, in non-urban areas, and the fact that those in advertising 
who work in non-urban areas have a similar average salary to their peers in London. Those in Architecture in 
non-urban areas also earn more than those in London. In all other sectors earnings in London are substantially 
higher than in both other urban areas and in non-urban areas. 
vi We have compared these differences between London and the rest of the UK to differences between London 
and other urban areas in the UK and found that the composition of the CCIs in London is very different from 
both other urban areas, non-urban areas throughout the country, and the rest of the country as a whole.  
vii Further details on all variables used in regressions can be found in the appendix to Laurison & Friedman 
2016 
viii It is worth noting here that this finding is driven by the impact of London, rather than the impact of working 
in any urban area. We have looked at whether this might be an urban/not effect rather than a specifically London 
effect by including a three-category variable for London, other Urban, and the rest of the UK; people living in 
London earn £8243 more (p<.001) on average than otherwise similar respondents living in other urban areas in 
the UK and working in the CCIs 
